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Abstract
We formalize a conception of authority, which is commonly defined as the right of controlling
a person’s actions embedded in human assets in sociology. Due to the inalienable property of
human assets, the contractible formal authority is hard to verify and enforce, while real authority
usually diverges from formal authority. Inefficiency tends to arise when a task is not routine or
can not be done by a robot. Using a framework of incomplete contract, we show that allocation
of formal authority, as an instrument to mitigate the inefficiency, is determined by features of
tasks and specificity of assets, and the relationship between the resources. Monitoring is then
introduced to fine tune value of delegation.
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1. introduction
Fortunately or unfortunately, very few people are his or her own boss. Most people are employ-
ees. Division managers work under direction of CEOs. Entrepreneurs are usually subject to control
rights of capitalists. Some workers enjoy a higher degree of freedom while many others complain
they work like robots. Workers’ control over their own actions also vary across industries, pro-
fessions, divisions and positions inside an organization. Important questions arise: what is the
control right of human assets? Why do different jobs result in different degree of freedom? What
determines the allocation of authority in an organization?
The control rights of human assets correspond to the definition of authority over a person in
sociology. James Coleman (Coleman (1994)) provides a well accepted definition:
Individuals may, under threat or promise or because they otherwise see it as in their
best interests to do so, give up the right to control certain of their actions. It is the
right to control another’s actions that is the usual definition of authority · · · . One
actor has authority over another in some domain of actions when the first holds the
right to direct the actions of the second in that domain.
A formal economic treatment of authority was conducted in Simon (1951). His seminal paper
investigated an employment relation where an employer exercises authority over an employee
when the latter permits the former to select elements from a collection of specific actions (the
area of acceptance) which the employee should perform on a job. That theory implies that even
if human assets themselves are not observable or not verifiable, authority over actions which are
embedded in human assets is contractible and transferrable.
Evidently, transfer of human assets is very different from that of physical assets due to the
inalienability nature of human assets. First, social norms put strong constraints on usage of
human assets. Usually, an employer can only control an employee’s actions based on voluntary
agreement. Second, the acceptance area is unlikely to be defined precisely unless the actions to
be performed are very simple. Third, human assets such as knowledge and skills are embedded in
human body. Even if they are observable and contractible, it is difficult to enforce the contractual
right of using these resources.
These difficulties demand a careful inspection of the conception of authority. Consistent with
Simon (1951) and Coleman (1994), an authority relation of one person over another exists when
the former has rights of control over certain actions of the latter. Different from them, we find
it necessary to distinguish nominal rights which are written down in a contract and actual imple-
mentation of these rights. We refer to the first as formal authority and the latter as real authority1.
For convenience, we call a person who obtains formal authority as a principal (she) and the other
subject to this formal authority an agent (he).
Sources of formal authority include legitimacy, institutions, forces, expertise, competency,
ownership, etc.. Whatever sources, the formal authority does not guarantee ultimate authority
over a person’s actions. When a principal acquires (purchases in economic activities) formal au-
thority, what she obtains is a promise from the agent to act in a certain way or the right to control
1These definitions correspond to nominal and functional authority in sociology.
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his actions within certain limits. The transfer of actions is never complete. In particular, the re-
quired actions imbedded in a person’s human assets may not be observable. A person can without
being noticed take an action or a combination of actions different from what he is asked to do.
Even when the actions are observable, they are not necessarily verifiable by a third party. Still in
many cases, even when actions are observable and verifiable, an agent may choose not to honor
the direction of his principal, when ex post punishment is infeasible or the agent is subject to
limited liability or other institutional constraints. In an extreme case, a slave is still likely to shirk.
In this paper, we focus on a situation where a principal obtains formal authority because she
controls critical physical resources for production, as in a paper on firm theory by Rajan and
Zingales (1998). When the principal-agent relationship comes into being, centralization is the
default authority regime. The principal chooses actions for the agent, but the agent can shirk
within a certain limit such that he can not be punished because of such deviation.
However, if the principal delegates the authority back to the agent, both formal authority and
real authority reside in the agent, who then has ultimate control over his own actions. This makes
it possible for the agent to pick some actions that bring him private benefits. His enlarged freedom
may be beneficial or detrimental to the principal’s interest. 2
Furthermore in order to employ the agent’s skills or knowledge, the principal has to transfer
the usage right of her physical assets to the agent, under centralisation or delegation. Under
centralisation, since the principal chooses the actions for the agent, the threat of misusing assets
is quite limited. However, under delegation, by allowing the agent freedom of choosing his own
actions, the principal is likely to give to him more freedom in the usage of her assets. As a result,
the agent obtains opportunities to use those resources to his own ends — possibly harmful to
the principal’s interests. Examples are numerous: the classic example of empire buildings, an
employee’s use of a company car for personal purposes, or exploitation of customer list to benefit
oneself.
In consequence, although delegation may invite higher efforts from the agent, it also brings
the principal a two-fold problem: 1) The agent may choose actions detrimental to the principal’s
interest; 2) The agent may divert a part of the physical assets. The tradeoff between losing control
and improvement of incentive makes delegation a difficult decision for the principal.
Determinants of allocation of authority are the properties of the assets and features of the
task. If the physical assets can be used for general purpose, it is easier for the agent to make
use of the physical assets for his private benefits. If the physical assets are instead very specific
to the task to be implemented, the agent’s usage of the physical assets for his private benefits
is restricted, and then his real authority is also limited. In the former case, the principal may
choose not to delegate since the agent may use the physical assets against her benefits, while
in the latter case, delegation may not give enough incentive since the agent has little chance of
obtaining private benefits. Similarly, if the task is very simple, few private benefits can be realized
by the agent under delegation and delegation would not be an effective instrument to provide
incentives. Only when the task is complicated enough is delegation necessary and meaningful.
2One may argue under centralisation the principal may use revelation mechanisms to find out the actions that
benefit the agent privately in order to improve the agent’s effort. We do not argue that there is no other ways
of reducing moral hazard problem. We rather argue that delegation is one practically used instrument, because
the principal fails to choose a task which privately benefits the agent due to overload of the principal or costly
communication.
2
We also explore the impact of monitoring on the allocation of authority. The principal, as
the owner of the physical assets, has incentives to monitor their usage. By keeping the right
of monitoring, she retains some real control over her assets, and to some extent also restricts
the agent’s actions and real authority. The possibility of monitoring improves the principal’s
payoff without reducing the feasible set of delegation. This explains that delegation always comes
together with monitoring, as frequently observed in practice.
Our paper is related to three strands of literature.
Property Right Literature. Some authors (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986)) suggest applying
the property right theory of firm to authority, which would be defined as the purchase of residual
rights over actions. This may be sensible when one compares an employment contract with a
sales contract as the former is much more roughly specified. However, due to the inalienability
of human actions, residual rights over actions will not be lost from human body even if they are
sold, which makes the right of using residual rights hardly contractible. In contrast, we distinguish
contractible formal authority from noncontractible real authority.
Moral Hazard Literature. Standard treatment of the moral hazard problem emphasizes
the non-observability of actions as the resource of inefficiency and thus design of optimal contract
through information inference. Our explanation to this problem lies in the nature of authority
and the separation of formal and real authority. We put more weights on the nonverifiability or
non-enforceability feature of actions.
Decision Right Literature. Our theory of formal and real authority is complementary to
an influential stand of literature initiated by Aghion and Tirole (1997). A fundamental difference
is that we define authority directly over human assets while their definition is referred to as
decision right of project choice. Our key purpose is to discover the nature of transaction of
human assets while theirs is to show the importance of information acquisition and revelation in
decision making. In our paper, information collection itself is not a determinant of allocation of
authority, rather the non-enforceability of the action is what causes the problem.
We also differ from the third strand of literature in another important aspect. In that litera-
ture, congruence in interests between the principal and the agent plays an important role and is
usually assumed to come from an intrinsic difference in preferences. In our model, congruence
is a result of the players’ rational responses to economic activities, namely, sharing rule over fi-
nal outcomes, productivity, features of tasks and characteristics of assets. In consequence, the
principal has to deal with the delegation issue more carefully in our model, which contributes to
a better understanding of the subtle real world.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize our general
setup, and derive conditions under which delegation is a Pareto improvement over centralisation.
In Section 3, we introduce monitoring into the model. In Section 4 we illustrate the most important
results from previous sections with a simplified example. Section 5 summarizes our findings, and
spell out potential applications and extensions of the general model.
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2. general setup
In this section, we set up a general model and examine conditions of optimal allocation of au-
thority to mitigate the inefficiency caused by the transaction of human assets. The principal, the
owner of some critical physical assets, employs the agent, the owner of human assets, to perform
production. The employment contract specifies roughly the task A. There are many ways of ac-
complishing the task, each is described by an action ai. The principal’s preferred action is aP and
that of the agent is aA. In general, aP ≠ aA, which reflects divergence of interests, however, aP
and aA share some dimensions in common. Both players are risk neutral. When the employment
contract is signed, the agent vests formal authority over the choice of action in the principal.
However, in the implementation of the contract, the principal may delegate this authority back to
the agent.
The task is characterized by θ := (γ, ξ), its complexity (γ) and the specificity (divisibility) of
assets (ξ) used on the task. θ is exogenous and is revealed after the employment contract is
signed. A higher γ refers to a more complicated task. A higher ξ means a more general usage of
the assets.
γ and ξ capture the divergence of interest between the two players. If γ is big, aP and aA
share very few dimensions in common. If ξ is big, the principal’s assets can be easily adapted for
personal benefits when the agent can choose the action.
To implement an action ai, the agent’s effort ei ∈ [0, e¯] is required. However, the effort level
mostly desired by the principal and the agent diverge. For example, under centralization, the
principal chooses her preferred action aP , the agent’s optimal effort level is eCA while the principal
prefers an effort level eCP .
The agent’s behavior in implementing the action, in particular, the agent’s effort, is partially
verifiable. There exists an interval E ⊂ [0, e¯] such that if the agent is expected to exert effort e˜
but his actual effort level eˆ falls outside that interval, such deviation is detected and verifiable to
a third party. But if eˆ falls in E, it is not verifiable to a third party. Interval E is exogenously given
and may be determined by γ. If a task is very complicated, an agent’s effort in implementing an
action is more difficult to verify.
The production function of the firm depends on the chosen action and can be described by a
real-valued function VR : (S, e;θ) → R, depending on the principal’s physical assets S ∈ R+, the
effort of implementing the action, and the state of world θ. Which action is chosen is determined
by the authority regime R ∈ {C,D}, with C for centralization and D for delegation. Under central-
ization, the principal chooses her preferred action aP , while under delegation, the agent chooses
his preferred action aA.
The sharing of output (firm value) is assumed to be predetermined: (λ,1−λ), with λ the share
obtained by the principal. This structure deviates from standard incomplete contract literature by
fixing sharing rule and excluding ex post renegotiation, since renegotiation is costly and not always
feasible.3 Such an exogenous fixed-share contract is well observed in reality: a fixed wage or (and)
a sharing rule of final outcome is specified at the very beginning of an employment contract.
3Our theory still holds for other incomplete contract settings. We adopt such a game structure mainly for the
purpose of convenience.
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When the agent works for the principal, besides his share of final output, he also receives
private benefits. Similar to Aghion and Tirole (1997), we interpret this as nonmonetary so as to
preclude direct ex post transfer between the two players.4 These benefits can come from social
norms, team spirits or even personal empathy or pride when working in the firm. As our aim
is to investigate the impact of authority allocation on the provision of incentives, we normalize
the agent’s private benefit under centralization to zero and denote that under delegation by B :
(S, e;θ)→ R.
Cost of effort is assumed to be separable and is independent of factors other than e. Then the
agent’s cost of effort can be described by a function C : [0, e¯]→ R or more condensely C(e).
The principal and the agent behave noncooperatively, each with the aim of maximizing her (or
his) own expected payoff. For simplicity, suppose the principal’s investment in the critical assets
S is irreversible and the costs are sunk. Then the principal’s investment decision does not interact
with the agent’s behaviour.
We impose the following assumptions on the functional forms of V(·), B(·) and C(·).
A1. V(S, e;γ, ξ) is nondecreasing in S and e, but nonincreasing in γ and ξ. B(S, e;γ, ξ) is
nondecreasing in all arguments. Both functions are continuous and concave in e. The cost function
C(e) is nondecreasing, continuous and convex.
The nonincreasing of V(·) in θ = (γ, ξ) and nondecreasing of B(·) in θ = (γ, ξ) reflects an
intrinsic conflict between the principal and the agent. The agent cares more about his private
benefits if he is able to tunnel more effort and employ more assets for his personal purpose. And
the agent’s realization of private benefits through tunnelling and stealing is against the principal’s
benefits.
A2. The parameter θ = (γ, ξ) lies in a compact space Θ ⊂ R2. In particular, γ ∈ [γ, γ¯] and
ξ ∈ [ξ, ξ¯], where γ, γ¯, ξ, ξ¯ are some finite real numbers.
A3. B(S, e;γ, ξ) and V(S, e;γ, ξ) are continuous in γ and ξ.
Assumptions A2 and A3 are not necessary to obtain our main insights. But they will lead to
much simplification and more explicit results.
Time structure of the game is summarized as follows.
At t = 1, features of the task are revealed and the principal reconsiders the authority regime
(R): whether to retain the formal authority over the agent’s actions herself (centralisation C) or
delegate the formal authority to the agent (delegation D).
At t = 2, the agent implements the action chosen by the principal under centralisation or
choose himself and implement an action from A under delegation.
At t = 3, the value of the firm is realized and shared according to the sharing rule (λ,1− λ).
The agent obtains private benefits as well.
4Actually the private benefits can be monetary as well. The key is that renegotiation is prevented (e.g. very costly)
and the predetermined sharing rule can be committed to.
5
Before carrying out the analysis, we stress that the inefficiency arising from the transaction of
human assets and separation of formal and real authority is fully embodied in the fixed sharing
rule and the partial verifiability of effort. The agent deviates from the requirement of the principal
because his marginal cost of effort is not fully compensated and this problem could have been
solved if the principal had full authority over his actions.
2.1. Centralisation
Under centralisation, the principal holds the formal authority and chooses her preferred action
aP . Given the sharing rule (λ,1 − λ) of the firm value, the principal expects a payoff equal to
λVC(S, e;θ) and does not bear the cost of effort. The agent expects a payoff equal to (1 −
λ)VC(S, e;θ) net of the effort cost C(e). However, the agent still holds some real authority in
choosing effort in the implementation of aP . The agent can not choose action to realize his pri-
vate benefits, therefore, we can drop θ out from the production function in this subsection.
Since the principal’s payoff is monotone increasing in e, the effort level desired by the principal
is eCP = e¯. In an unusual case where the principal possesses both formal and real authority over
the agent’s actions, the principal would choose that effort level. Such slavery-like scheme may
exist in very simple tasks, where E is very small. If the agent chooses effort outside the range
E, he gets punished. In those situations, there is no need to delegate. This may explain why we
rarely observe delegation in manual work in reality.
However, if the task is complicated, E is necessarily big, the real authority of the agent plays a
role, and he may choose an effort level different from that desired by the principal without being
detected. Then the agent’s optimum effort level is to maximize the following objective function:
(1− λ)VC(S, e)− C(e) subject to e ∈ E
Suppose e′ is the unique maximizer of the unconstrained maximization problem. It is deter-
mined by
(1− λ)∂V
C(S, e′)
∂e
= dC(e
′)
de
(1)
Obviously when inf E > e′, the agent will not choose an effort higher than inf E as he bears the
cost alone but shares the output with the principal. In equilibrium, the effort chosen by the agent
is eC := max{e′, inf E}. Such an effort is obviously lower than e¯. We summarize the result in
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under centralisation, given sufficiently large E, the agent chooses an effort level
that is lower than that preferred by the principal.
The result is similar to the classical moral hazard problem in the literature. However, we
stress that, rather than directly from the nonobservability of actions, the problem stems from
the transaction of human assets and the separation of formal and real authority over actions.
Nonverifiability and nonenforceability of the agent’s action leads to the deviation of eC from e¯. If
the principal had both formal and real authority, there would be no such deviation problem. If
full compliance with the principal’s direction is verifiable, then the problem is also easily solvable
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through contracting. However, in reality, most agents are not robots and always have some degree
of freedom in the implementation of their actions.
Under centralisation, the payoffs of the principal and the agent are respectively
VCP := λVC(S, eC); VCA := (1− λ)VC(S, eC)− C(eC).
2.2. Delegation and Optimal Allocation of Authority
Alternative to retaining the formal authority over the agent’s actions, the principal can delegate
this authority back to the agent, and allow the agent to choose the action. Given this freedom, the
agent chooses his preferred action aA. Depending on the feature of the task, aA may share little
common feature with aP , and the agent may even steal some assets for personal benefits, to the
principal’s dismay.
Now the agent’s objective function becomes:
B(S, e;γ, ξ)+ (1− λ)VD(S, e;γ, ξ)− C(e)
where B(·) is the private benefits the agent obtains due to his freedom in the choice of action
under delegation.
The agent will choose an equilibrium effort level eD, which is determined by the first order
condition
∂B(S, eD;γ, ξ)
∂e
+ (1− λ)∂V
D(S, eD;γ, ξ)
∂e
= dC(e
D)
de
(2)
If ∂B(S,e;γ,ξ)∂e is large enough while
∂VD(S,e;γ,ξ)
∂e is not too small in comparison to
∂VC(S,e)
∂e , e
D is likely
to exceed eC .
Under delegation, the payoffs of the principal and the agent are respectively
VDP : = λVD(S, eD;γ, ξ)
VDA : = B(S, eD;γ, ξ)+ (1− λ)VD(S, eD;γ, ξ)− C(eD)
Define ∆VDP := VDP − VCP and ∆VDA := VDA − VCA . The principal, under centralisation, receives
VCP = λV(S, eC), while obtaining VDP = λV(S, eD;γ, ξ) after delegation. We assume that S has no
future use and the principal only cares about her monetary payoff at the end stage of the game.
So as long as VD(S, eD;γ, ξ) > VC(S, eC), ∆VDP is positive and the principal is willing to transfer
formal authority (back) to the agent. This is possible when the increase of firm value from higher
effort exceeds the detriment from loss of control over assets and actions.
To find the optimal set of delegation, we do not need to worry about the individual rationality
constraint of the agent (∆VDA ≥ 0). When ∆VDA < 0, the principal is indifferent between centrali-
sation and delegation since the principal could choose delegation but it will simply be ignored by
the agent.
Proposition 2 Under delegation, the agent is never worse off in comparison to centralisation.
Delegation is a Pareto improvement over centralisation iff VD(S, eD;γ, ξ) > VC(S, eC). This is true
only for a set of {γ, ξ} with proper values.
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Evidently delegation is never a bad for the agent. Otherwise, he would just behave as if delega-
tion had not taken place. For the principal, the situation is much more complicated. By delegation,
she transfers formal authority back to the agent, and the agent can pick any actions in the accep-
tance area. Moreover, she allows the agent more freedom in the use of her critical assets.
Since aA and aP share some common features, if the agent’s actual choice of effort increases,
the principal may be better off because improved accomplishment of those common features.
However, she may also be worse off if γ and ξ are too big, as there are too few common features
or too many assets are diverted for the agent’s private benefits.
Therefore, the principal faces the tradeoff between losing control over her assets and the
agent’s actions and incentivizing the agent to work harder. She has to choose carefully the au-
thority regime that is better for her, by comparing her payoffs under centralisation and delegation,
on the basis of her knowledge about the task, that is, the specificity of the assets and the com-
plexity of the task.
Using assumptions A1-A3, one can find that the set of parameters under which delegation is
feasible is well defined.
Proposition 3 If assumptions A1-A3 are satisfied and ifΘ is sufficiently large, Θ can be partitioned
into two sets F and Fc , each being a collection of subsets, such that F ∪ Fc = Θ. For θ ∈ F , delegation
is superior while centralisation dominates for θ ∈ Fc .
Proof Define ∆V := VD(S, eD;γ, ξ) − VC(S, eC). Then ∆V is continuous in γ and ξ or more
condensely in θ. For a sufficiently large parameter space Θ, there exist θ1 ∈ Θ and θ2 ∈ Θ such
that ∆V(θ1) > 0 and ∆V(θ2) < 0. By continuity, there must exist at least some θ3 ∈ Θ such
that ∆V(θ3) = 0, under which the principal is indifferent between centralisation and delegation.
This means that the space Θ can be partitioned into two sets F and Fc , each being a collection of
subsets, such that F ∪ Fc = Θ, and ∆V(θ) ≥ 0 for θ ∈ F and ∆V(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ Fc . The boundary
of the set F is well defined in the sense that the closure of F is continuous, by the continuity
assumptions in B1-B3. 
A likely modelling form is that
VC = V(S, e), VD = V((1− ξ)S, (1− γ)e), B(.) = B(ξS, γe) (3)
with γ ∈ [0,1] and ξ ∈ [0,1]. In these functions, the assets are divisible and have general usage,
with one portion (1− ξ) serving for the value of the firm and the other (ξ) for the agent’s private
purpose. The efforts devoted to private benefits and firm production are substitutes. Given total
effort e, if the agent devotes more effort to the production of private benefits (portion γ), less
efforts would be used in the firm production.
Suppose (3) holds, we can derive some more precise predictions about the effort levels and the
feasible set of delegation.
Proposition 4 Suppose (3) holds, and E is sufficiently large that eC = e′.
1. If the principal’s assets and agent’s efforts are substitute or independent, delegation always
leads to higher effort, eD > eC ;
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2. If the principal’s assets and the agent’s efforts are complements, eD > eC only if γ and ξ are
sufficiently big.
Proof 1. Assets and efforts are substitute or independent means that ∂V
2
∂S∂e ≤ 0. One has:
∂VD
∂e |e=eC ≥ ∂V
C
∂e |e=eC since less assets are used in firm production under delegation. Recall that
∂B
∂e > 0, the left-hand-side of equation (2) is bigger than that of equation (1) when evaluated at
e = eC , hence eD > eC .
2. Assets and efforts are complements means that ∂V
2
∂S∂e > 0. One has:
∂VD
∂e |e=eC < ∂V
C
∂e |e=eC
since less assets are used in firm production under delegation. Recall the continuity assumptions
and the fact that B is nondecreasing in θ, while VD is nonincreasing in θ, there exists at least one
pair (γ˜, ξ˜), such that if γ ≥ γ˜ and ξ ≥ ξ˜, eD > eC . 
Proposition 5 Suppose (3) holds, and E is sufficiently large that eC = e′.
1. If the principal’s assets and agent’s efforts are substitute or independent, delegation is only
feasible if γ and ξ are not too big;
2. If the principal’s assets and the agent’s efforts are complements, delegation is only feasible if
γ and ξ are neither too big nor too small.
If the assets and the efforts are substitutes or independent, delegation always improves the
agent’s incentives. Aghion and Tirole (1997) provides a good example. In their model, the prin-
cipal’s and agent’s contributions to the firm are substitutable, as both players exert efforts to
collect information on a same project. However, high effort from the agent does not necessarily
mean that delegation is good for the principal. When γ and ξ are big, the agent’s interest is too
divergent from that of the principal and too much efforts and assets are diverted to the agent’s
private benefits. Consider the extreme case that γ → 1 and ξ → 1. Under delegation, the effort and
assets devoted to the firm production are close to zero, and the principal’s payoff is also close to
zero, while under centralization, although the agent shirks, the principal receives strictly positive
payoff. Hence, the principal will not delegate power to the agent.
If the assets and the efforts are highly complementary, for example, both V(·) and B(·) take
the form of Cobb-Douglas production function or even more extreme Leontief production func-
tion, the decision about authority regime is more delicate. If γ and ξ are too big, the principal
encounters the same problem as when S and e are substitutes. When γ and (or) ξ are small, dele-
gation does not help very much to improve the agent’s incentive as the agent’s efforts are of little
value to his private benefits without the principal’s assets. If delegation does not improve the
agent’s effort, it is not optimal to the principal either. As a result, delegation is only feasible when
γ and ξ lie in some intermediate range. This case will be illustrated with an example in section 4.
In this section, we started from a moral hazard problem due to separation of formal and real
authority and suggested that through delegation, a process to reunite formal and real authority,
the agent’s incentive may be improved. However, delegation also imposes a cost on the principal
since she loses control over the agent’s actions and her own assets. The tradeoff is complicated
by the subtle features of the task. In the next section, we will show that through monitoring,
an increased real control over her assets, the principal can improve her control over the agent’s
actions indirectly.
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3. delegation with monitoring
As stated in the introduction, monitoring is one part of ordinary life of almost every boss or
manager in a firm. Under delegation, it is very often observed that a principal keeps the right of
monitoring. In the context of our model, either the principal and the agent agree that the principal
monitors or the principal automatically keeps the right of monitoring due to law or social norms.
We will show that monitoring improves the principal’s payoff without reducing her own action
space and becomes a powerful instrument to induce desirable actions from the agent.
Monitoring can be written down at the contracting stage, together with an agreement of the
acceptance area. Alternatively, the decision of monitoring can be made jointly with the choice of
authority regime at stage t = 1. We will consider the second case in our model. That is, at stage
t = 1, the principal’s decision regime of organizational form is R ∈ {C,D,M}, where M refers
to delegation with monitoring and D pure delegation (or delegation without monitoring). Then
at stage t = 2, the principal monitors as the agent carries out the task. We do not consider the
case of centralisation with monitoring, as monitoring, if there is, is always a part of the process
of centralisation.
The principal’s target of monitoring is to protect her own interest while inducing desirable
actions from the agent. Monitoring activities can be classified into three groups. The first is
to monitor the agent’s actions directly. In other words, through monitoring, the principal may
affect or even control the agent’s real authority. The second one is to monitor the final outcome.
According to the contractual arrangement of the sharing rule, both the principal and the agent
have rights to benefit from the value of the firm. But there may be problems in realization of her or
his revenue when the final outcome itself is unobservable or unverifiable. The third is to monitor
the financial assets. As the owner of the critical assets, the principal holds the formal control
rights over these assets. But she has to give away power of using these assets when delegating
formal authority to the agent. To assure proper employment of the assets, the principal may have
incentive to monitor these assets.
In our model, the working mechanisms of the three types of monitoring, direct supervision
of the agent’s behaviour, which is indicated by γ; examination of the final output, which can be
captured by λ; and inspection of the principal’s critical assets, measured by ξ, yields similar qual-
itative results. As stated in the introduction, we follow the third line here. This simplification
is not far from reality, if not more realistic, taking into account failures of direct monitoring or
imperfect monitoring due to the unobservability and nonverifiability of behaviour and outcomes.
In large companies, the board of director usually can not observe the CEO’s behaviour, let alone
those activities conducted by lower level managers. In multinational firms, how can a CEO su-
pervise a division manager thousand kilometers away? In looser principal-agent relations, for
example a creditor and a debtor, it is almost unlikely to restrict the agent’s actions directly. Even
when actions are observable, due to the separation of formal and real authority, direct monitoring
and monitoring of final outcome that depends on the actions may not be effective at all, since the
agent always holds part of the real control over his own actions.
By delegation, the principal grants the agent the formal right of usage of her critical assets.
However, she, as the owner of the assets, is always able to restrict the agent’s actions by inspecting
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the usage of her critical assets and thus protect her own benefits. The inspection activities include
requiring frequent reports, auditing financial statements and checking inventories etc.
To save notations, we let monitoring m enter ξ as if the principal’s auditing can change the
asset specificity. This is a realistic way of modelling as the divisibility of resources is a key feature
of asset specificity. If ξ(m) decreases with m, a more strict control of assets will reduce the
degree of theft and yield a result similar to an increase in asset specificity. We maintain the basic
assumptions A1-A3 and add some structures concerning the principal’s monitoring behaviour.
B1. The cost function of monitoring is a continuous mapping G(m) : [0, m¯] → R+, with
G(0) = 0. Moreover, G′(m) > 0 and G′′(m) ≥ 0.
B2. ξ(m) is a continuous function from [0, m¯] onto [0, ξ] with ξ(m¯) = 0, ξ(0) = ξ and
ξ′(m) ≤ 0.
Assumption B1 is to impose some regularity on the costly behaviour of monitoring. A fixed cost
may be involved in supervision of the agent’s actions. Since that is needed under centralisation
as well, it can be normalized to zero. Assumption B2 concerns the impact of the principal’s
monitoring activity. The monitoring effort of the principal reduces the portion of assets that the
agent can steal.
Since monitoring is costly, with imperfect monitoring, the agent can still steal part of the
assets. His payoff now can be written as:
VMA (S, e,m) = BM(S, e;γ, ξ(m))+ (1− λ)VM(S, e;γ, ξ(m))− C(e)
and the principal’s payoff function is
VMP (S, e,m) = λVM(S, e;γ, ξ(m))−G(m)
In these equations, the major difference with delegation without monitoring is ξ(m), which mea-
sures the effectiveness of monitoring. If the principal’s monitoring is sufficiently effective, ξ(m)
may approach zero. Then just like under centralisation, the agent can not remove any part of the
assets. But it is still possible for a delegated agent to tunnel his efforts even under monitoring due
to the freedom he has in choosing his actions. When the principal chooses the authority regime,
she takes her equilibrium monitoring into account. The functions ξ(m) and G(m) will play an
important role in her delegation decision.
As we are considering the case in which the decision of monitoring takes place along with
choice of authority regime, the game is like a sequential game in which the principal moves first
by choosing the monitoring level. Therefore the principal
max
m
VMP (S, e,m)
s.t. e ∈ arg max
e˜
VMA (S, e˜,m)
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With the regular concavity assumptions, the agent’s optimal effort e(m) is determined by the
following first order condition
∂BM(S, e;γ, ξ(m))
∂e
+ (1− λ)∂V
M(S, e;γ, ξ(m))
∂e
= dC(e)
de
Then the principal
max
m
VMP (m
M) := VMP (S, e(m);γ, ξ(m))
If interior solutions exist, the optimal level of monitoring is determined by
λ
∂VM(S, e(m);γ, ξ(m))
∂m
= dG(m)
dm
Given the equilibrium{e¯M , m¯M}, the payoff of the two players are respectively:
VMP = λVM
(
S, e(m¯M);γ, ξ(m¯M)
)
−G(m¯M)
VMA = BM
(
S, e(m¯M);γ, ξ(m¯M)
)
+ (1− λ)VM
(
S, e(m¯M);γ, ξ(m¯M)
)
− C(e¯M)
We know immediately the principal will choose delegation with monitoring, and the agent will
accept this formal power if the following conditions are satisfied:
VMP ≥max{VCP , VDP }; VMA ≥ VCA
Similar to delegation without monitoring, the set of parameters {γ, ξ} should take proper
values to make delegation with monitoring feasible. The feasible set of parameters depends on
interactions between actions of the principal and the agent and the functional forms.
There is an additional tradeoff faced by the principal with the option of monitoring. On the
one hand, the principal can restrict the agent’s misbehaviour by having a tighter control over the
usage of her assets when the critical assets and the agent’s action are highly complementary in
the production of private benefits. On the other hand, her monitoring activities incur costs. If
her inspection activities are not sufficiently effective or too expensive, the principal would not
monitor at all, bringing us back to the case where monitoring is not possible at all.
3.1. Monitoring vs. No Monitoring
Even though few general statements can be made without further specifications of the model, a
robust result is that the principal has a tendency to maintain the right of monitoring. Furthermore,
the possibility of monitoring expands the feasible set of delegation.
The intuition is straightforward. Monitoring expands the principal’s action space. Under a
decision theory framework, it is always true that a decision maker with more possible actions is
no worse off than one with less actions. This is indeed our case since the principal can move first
and has right to design an enforceable contract. In a game theory framework, the result does not
necessarily hold. We will discuss the difference as a caveat. The principal’s expansion in action
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space can make delegation more desirable in some situations, and this may lead to an enlarged
feasibility set of delegation. The proof is particularly easy with our continuity assumptions.
First of all we will show that VMP ≥ VDP always holds, and the principal only needs to choose
between centralisation and delegation with monitoring (with pure delegation as special case),
subject to the individual rationality constraint of the agent. Then we show that the individual
rationality constraint of the agent never reduces the feasibility set of delegation when monitoring
is possible.
Lemma 1 If delegation happens without monitoring, the principal is also willing to transfer formal
authority to the agent with monitoring.
Proof Denote the value of delegation with monitoring to the principal as ∆MP = VMP − VCP . What
to be shown is if ∆DP ≥ 0, ∆MP ≥ 0. We only need to prove ∆MP ≥ ∆DP . This can be easily done by
contradiction.
Suppose ∆MP < ∆
D
P and m¯M > 0, that implies V
M
P < V
D
P . The principal will then choose m = 0
as VMP (e¯M ,m = 0) = VDP , which leads to a contradiction. Thus ∆MP ≥ ∆DP ≥ 0 if ∆DP ≥ 0. 
This lemma states that for the principal delegation with monitoring weakly dominates pure
delegation even when monitoring is costly. The principal is never worse off when she can use mon-
itoring as her strategic instrument. Of course, the principal would give up the right of monitoring
or commit not to monitor if it is not in her favor.
Lemma 2 Under some given parameter values, even if delegation is not feasible without monitoring,
it is feasible for the principal to delegate with monitoring.
Proof We want to prove there exists some θˆ ∈ Θ, such that ∆DP (θˆ) < 0, but ∆MP (θˆ) ≥ 0. By
assumptions A2-A3 and B1-B2, VP(mM) = VP(S, e(m);γ, ξ(m)|M) is continuous in ξ. Define
∆VP(mM) = VP(mM) − VCP . Obviously ∆VP(mM) is also continuous in ξ. We pick up a pair
of parameter values {γ, ξ + } and {γ, ξ − } for a sufficiently small , such that ∆VP(mM =
0|γ, ξ + ) = ∆VDP (γ, ξ + ) < 0 and ∆VP(mM = 0|γ, ξ − ) = ∆VDP (γ, ξ − ) > 0, then there
must exist a {γ, ξ} with ξ ∈ [ξ − ||, ξ + ||] such that ∆VDP (γ, ξ) = ∆VP(mM = 0|γ, ξ) = 0. This
is always possible if Θ is large enough as we discussed in last section. Obviously, ∆VP(mM) is
continuous in mM . Since ξ′(m) ≤ 0, it is true that for some positive δ such that ∆VP(mM =
δ > 0|γ, ξ + ) = ∆VP(mM = 0|γ, ξ) = 0. By definition, VMP (γ, ξ + ) = supVP(mM |γ, ξ + ).
Immediately we obtain the result that for {γ, ξ + }, ∆VDP (γ, ξ + ) < 0 while ∆VMP (γ, ξ + ) ≥ 0.

This lemma indicates that the principal is more likely to transfer power when monitoring is
possible. In contrast to Lemma 1, the proof of Lemma 2 relies on the continuity assumptions,
which are somewhat technical but give intuitive results. With the nice properties of continuity,
the valuation function ∆VMP is continuous in the parameter vector θ. If the parameter space Θ
is indeed partitioned into two sets F and Fc , where F is the feasible set of delegation without
monitoring and Fc the complement, we can pick up those parameter values of Fc close to its
boundary, and disturb those values by monitoring. It is possible that those disturbed values will
13
lie in the set F and delegation becomes feasible. The result is just as if the boundary of set F
expands if monitoring is allowed. This intuitive reasoning leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Monitoring enlarges the set of parameters under which delegation is feasible for the prin-
cipal.
Proof We have already shown that there exists some mM > 0 such that ∆DP (γ, ξ) ≤ 0 but
∆MP (mM , γ, ξ) > 0. In equilibrium, ∆
M
P (mM , γ, ξ) = ∆MP (γ, ξ(mM)). Let ξˆ = ξ(mM), then a deci-
sion of delegation without monitoring with respect to parameters {γ, ξˆ} is always duplicated by
a decision of delegation with monitoring with respect to parameters {γ, ξ} where usually ξˆ ≠ ξ.
Together with Lemma 1 that ∆DP (γ, ξ) ≥ 0 implies ∆MP (mM , γ, ξ) ≥ 0, we have proved the result.
Similar reasoning applies to the parameter γ. 
The Lemma 3 is just an extension of Lemma 2. In the three lemmas above, we have shown
that monitoring (weakly) increases the value of delegation to the principal. We show in the next
lemma that the individual rationality constraint of the agent does not reduce the feasible set of
delegation.
Lemma 4 The individual rationality constraint of the agent does not reduce the feasible set of del-
egation when monitoring is possible.
Proof Under authority regime M , the agent accepts delegation if ∆MA ≥ 0. However, suppose
there exists some mM > 0 such that ∆DA ≥ 0 > ∆MA . The agent accepts delegation when no
monitoring is imposed and ignores delegation if the equilibrium level of monitoring is imposed.
In this case, as long as ∆DP > 0, the equilibrium monitoring chosen by the principal is m¯M = 0
since that gives her a payoff equal to VDP , which is greater than V
C
P , her payoff from delegation
with a monitoring level mM . This means, when monitoring is possible, a necessary condition for
delegation to take place is max{∆MA ,∆DA} ≥ 0, instead of ∆MA ≥ 0. Hence, the IR constraint of the
agent does not reduce the feasible set of delegation. 
The result of the above four lemmas is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose there exists a pair of equilibrium value {e¯M , m¯M}, such that VMP ≥ VCP and
VMP is continuous in θ. Monitoring increases the value of delegation to the principal and expands
the feasible set of delegation.
The first condition in the above proposition, VMP ≥ VCP for some γ and ξ, is about the feasibility
of delegation, which can be guaranteed by the assumptions. The second condition, continuity of
VMP in θ, states that from the perspective of the principal, her value of delegation is continuous
in the equilibrium monitoring effort and the result is as if she could alter or at least disturb the
parameter values. The main implication of the proposition is that when it is not too costly, mon-
itoring always goes hand in hand with delegation, unless the principal is forced to commitment
of no monitoring.
However the above proposition crucially depends on the assumption that the principal has
the right to design the delegation contract at stage t = 1 and she is expected to commit her
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behaviour during the interaction between the two players. Under that assumption, the principal
is a decision maker who can always avoid threats from the agent’s misbehaviour. If monitoring
can not be written down in the delegation contract or the principal can not commit her monitoring
behaviour, the game becomes simultaneous, and the principal and the agent choose actions at the
same time at stage t = 2.
Assume the existence of interior solutions {êM , m̂M}. The pair is determined by solving the
following two simultaneous equations:
λ
∂VM(S, e;γ, ξ(m))
∂m
= dG(m)
dm
∂BM(S, e;γ, ξ(m))
∂e
+ (1− λ)∂V
M(S, e;γ, ξ(m))
∂e
= dC(e)
de
It is possible that under some parameter values the equilibrium payoffs for the principal and
the agent are both worse off than the case when monitoring is not possible. This is another version
of the prisoners’ dilemma. The intuition can be seen from the following example. Suppose when
choosing the authority regime at stage t = 1, the principal promises not to monitor the agent. If
this is indeed the case, the agent will exert an effort level eD and the principal and the agent will
obtain VDP and V
D
A respectively. But if the principal’s promise is not credible, the agent expects
that the principal will monitor to some extent when he chooses eD. Then it is to his benefits
to deviate from eD. Their strategic behaviour under individual rationality eventually leads to an
equilibrium {êM , m̂M}, which is likely to hurt both players.
To avoid this unfavorable result, it is crucial for the principal to make credible commitment
of monitoring before the implementation of the task. That’s why in reality monitoring is quite
often an explicit item in a delegation contract. Of course, when monitoring cost is sufficiently
high, the principal’s behaviour always has commitment power and monitoring is not necessary to
be written down explicitly.
In this section, we introduced monitoring into the model. Although the basic structure is very
similar to the game without monitoring, the working mechanism is more complicated, since there
is an interaction between the principal’s monitoring and the agent’s effort. When monitoring
enters the principal’s action space, the principal tends to make use of these additional actions. If
monitoring is a Pareto improvement over pure delegation, there is no ambiguity. But if this is not
the case, the agent is hurt by monitoring and may take actions which induce strategic actions of
the principal. In equilibrium, both may be hurt. The principal should be cautious about this case
when monitoring is bundled with delegation.
Leaving out the above caveat, the principal through monitoring is able to increase her real
control over the usage of her assets, and hence extract more surplus, possibly at the expense of
the agent’s private benefits. It is not clear whether the total welfare increases or decreases in
comparison to pure delegation since the principal’s payoff increases because of monitoring but
the agent’s payoff may decrease.
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4. an example
In this section, we develop a highly simplified and specific model to illustrate how different regimes
of authority allocation evolves as a response to distinct parameter sets.
The principal’s physical assets S is normalized to unit. The critical assets owned by the prin-
cipal and the actions of the agent are highly complementary. We assume that both V(.) and
B(.) take the form of Cobb-Douglas production function. The firm value under centralisation is
V(S, e;θ) = e, and the agent realizes no private benefits. Under delegation, the firm value is equal
to V(S, e;θ) = (1−ξ)(1−γ)e, which will be shared between the two players, and the agent realizes
private benefits B(S, e;θ) = γξe.
The agent’s cost of effort is quadratic: C(e) = 12ae2, with a > 0. For simplicity, the domain of
e is restricted to [0,1].
The payoffs of the two players under the two authority regimes R ∈ {C,D} are respectively:
VRP (e) :=
λe if R = Cλ(1− γ)(1− ξ)e if R = D
for the principal and
VRA (e) :=
(1− λ)e− C(e) if R = Cγξe+ (1− λ)(1− γ)(1− ξ)e− C(e) if R = D
for the agent.
4.1. Centralisation vs. Delegation and Feasible Set of Delegation
Under centralisation, the agent chooses an effort level to maximize his expected payoff VCA (e).
Suppose E is sufficiently large, the equilibrium effort is given by
eC := arg max
e
VCA (e) =
1
a
(1− λ)
The principal and the agent’s payoffs are respectively:
VCP =
1
a
λ(1− λ); VCA =
1
2a
(1− λ)2
Under delegation, the agent obtains private benefits since he diverts a portion γ of his effort
and steals a portion ξ of the assets for his private purpose. His equilibrium choice of effort is
given by:
eD := arg max
e
VDA (e) =
1
a
α(γ, ξ)
where α(γ, ξ) := γξ + (1− λ)(1− γ)(1− ξ). α(γ, ξ) captures the marginal return to the agent’s
effort: γξ measuring the return from private benefits, and (1− λ)(1− γ)(1− ξ) the return from
his share of the firm value. The agent determines the optimal effort by setting marginal return
equal to marginal cost ae. Delegation mitigates moral hazard when eD > eC .
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Proposition 7 Delegation induces higher effort from the agent if (γ, ξ) are such that
α(γ, ξ) ≥ 1− λ (4)
Note that condition (4) can be rewritten as:
γξ − (1− λ)(γ + ξ − γξ) > 0
Under delegation, the agent faces a tradeoff when he increases his effort over that under centrali-
sation: an incremental payoff from his private benefits measured by γξ, and an incremental loss
from his share of the firm value, measured by the second term on the left hand side of the above
inequality. This loss comes from the fact that under delegation less assets (1 − ξ < 1) and only
a portion of his effort (1 − γ) is used in the production of the firm value. As long as the over-
all incremental payoff is positive, the agent will exert higher effort under delegation than under
centralisation.
The major implication of Proposition (7) is that when sharing rule can not be adjusted to give
the agent the right incentive, delegation can be used as a substitute. Given a certain effort level,
tunnelling of effort and theft of assets decrease the firm value. However, when the agent has the
freedom to choose his actions, the opportunity of tunnelling and theft brings him private benefits.
If his overall payoff is increased, he has an incentive to work harder.
As in the general model, delegation is only feasible if it improves the principal’s payoff without
putting the agent in a worse situation than under centralisation. The payoffs of the two players
are given by
VDP =
λ
a
(1− γ)(1− ξ)α(γ, ξ)
VDA =
1
2a
(α(γ, ξ))2
The feasible set of delegation can be found be solving the following program:
∆VDP = VDP − VCP ≥ 0 subject to ∆VDA = VDA − VCA ≥ 0
The necessary and sufficient condition for ∆VDP ≥ 0 is:
(1− γ)(1− ξ)α(γ, ξ) ≥ 1− λ
Since (1−γ)(1−ξ) < 1, if the above inequality holds, it implies that condition (4), the necessary and
sufficient condition for ∆VDA ≥ 0, holds as well. That means if delegation improves the principal’s
payoff, it also improves the agent’s payoff. Here we do not have a case that delegation is chosen
by the principal but is ignored by the agent since it reduces his payoff.
Proposition 8 The feasible set of delegation is given by:
F = {(γ, ξ)|(1− γ)(1− ξ)α(γ, ξ) ≥ 1− λ}
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For given λ, delegation is feasible if both γ and ξ lie in an intermediate range. When γ or ξ
is small, the productivity of private benefits is insignificantly low such that delegation has little
incentive effect. When both γ and ξ are big, delegation is effective in providing the right incentives
for the agent. In the extreme case where γ = ξ = 1, the agent exerts the efficient level of effort since
he receives the entire outcome of his actions. However, this is at the expense of the principal’s
interest since the assets are used in a way not for her benefit. The principal would not delegate
authority since her payoff decreases in comparison to centralisation.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Ξ0
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0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Γ
F
Figure 1: Feasible Set of Delegation for λ = 0.95
The feasible set F may be empty if λ is small. That is due to the assumption in this example
that the assets (similarly effort) used for the private benefits and the production of the firm sum
up to 1. This is true for exclusive assets whose usage for one purpose excludes the usage for
another purpose, for example capital. However, there are also other assets that the usage for one
purpose does not completely excludes them from being used for other purposes, for example
office rooms and computers, where the feasible set may be nonempty even when λ is small.
4.2. Delegation with monitoring
When the possibility of monitoring is not precluded, the principal can choose between centrali-
sation C , pure delegation D (or delegation without monitoring) and delegation with monitoring
M . When delegation with monitoring is chosen, there is an interaction between the principal’s
monitoring and the agent’s effort.
To simplify computation, we assume that the cost function of the principal’s monitoring is
linear: G(m) := gm, m ∈ [0, ξ], g > 0. The effect of monitoring is embodied in ξ(m) := ξ −m.
4.2..1 Subgame Equilibrium under Authority Regime M
The objective function of the agent is:
VMA (m, e) = γ(ξ −m)e+ (1− λ)(1− γ)(1− ξ +m)e−
1
2
ae2
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Given a promised monitoring level m, the agent chooses his effort e that satisfies the first order
condition:
e(m) = 1
a
(α(γ, ξ)− βm) = eD − β
a
m (5)
where β := γ − (1− λ)(1− γ).
Equation (5) tells us how the agent determines his optimal effort as a response to the moni-
toring level chosen by the principal. β measures the impact of monitoring on the agent’s payoff.
One more unit of monitoring reduces the agent’s private benefits by γ units and increases his
payoff from the firm value by (1 − γ)(1 − λ) units. β can be positive or negative, depending the
tradeoff of the two effects. When β is positive, the agent’s reaction function is downward sloping,
monitoring chokes down the agent’s working initiative and the negative effect on his private ben-
efits dominates the positive effect on his share of the firm value. The agent exerts less effort when
monitoring is imposed. When β is negative, monitoring and the effort of the agent are strategically
complementary, and the agent’s reaction function is upward sloping. The agent’s return from the
firm value dominates such that more strictly monitoring induces harder working5. β = 0 is the
special case that the impact of monitoring on the agent’s private benefits and returns from the
firm value exactly offset each other. In our example, when we proceed to solve for the game, we
will see that when β ≤ 0 delegation is never feasible, since the productivity of private benefits is
so low in comparison to that of the firm value that the agent’s individual rationality constraint is
never satisfied to accept delegation.
The principal chooses her monitoring level to maximize the following objective:
VMP (m, e(m)) = λ(1− γ)(1− ξ +m)e(m)− gm
Suppose the equilibria are given by (e¯M , m¯M). Under delegation with monitoring, the payoffs of
the two players are:
VMA = VMA (m¯M , e(m¯M)) =
1
2
a e(m¯M)2 = 1
2
a(α(γ, ξ)− βm¯M)2
VMP = VMP (m¯M , e(m¯M)) = VCP +∆1(m¯M) = VDP +∆2(m¯M)
with ∆1(m¯M) and ∆2(m¯M) respectively the maximum value of the following functions:
∆1(m) =VMP (m, e(m))− VCP
=− λ
a
(1− γ)βm2 − (g − gˆ)m− λ
a
((1− γ)−α(γ, ξ)(1− γ)(1− ξ))
∆2(m) =VMP (m, e(m))− VDP = −
λ
a
(1− γ)βm2 − (g − gˆ)m
where gˆ := 1a(1− γ)λ (α(γ, ξ)− β+ βξ).
The principal’s choice of equilibrium m¯M depends on g. If monitoring is very costly to her,
positive level of monitoring decreases her payoff in comparison to no monitoring and she would
5This corresponds an interesting story told by Alchian and Demsetz(Alchian and Demsetz (1972)): a group of
workers may hire (maybe quite expensively) a supervisor to inspect shirking of any member. In our story, the agent
pays the principal to monitor himself in order to prevent his diversion of effort to other use, which is less productive.
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prefer not to monitor at all.
4.2..2 Expansion of Feasible Set though Monitoring
In a sequential game where monitoring level is chosen before the choice of the agent’s effort, the
principal can choose any monitoring level she prefers, subject to the agent’s individual rationality
(IR) constraint
VMA ≥ VCA a α(γ, ξ)− βm¯M ≥ 1− λ (6)
We first show that when β is negative, there exists no positive monitoring level that the agent’s IR
is satisfied.
Lemma 5 When β ≤ 0, there exists no positive level of monitoring that satisfies the individual ratio-
nality constraint of the agent.
Proof Suppose β ≤ 0, since m¯M ≤ ξ, −βξ ≥ −βm¯M , we have:
α(γ, ξ)− βm¯M ≤ α(γ, ξ)− βξ = (1− λ)(1− γ) < 1− λ
there exists no equilibrium m¯M such that (6) is satisfied. 
When β ≤ 0, delegation with monitoring is not feasible to the agent, or the agent ignores
delegation if it takes place. This implies that delegation is infeasible no matter monitoring is
possible or not, since F = ∅ when β ≤ 0. As a result, we can restrict our further discussion to
β > 0.
Two cases will be distinguished. For parameters (γ, ξ) ∈ Fc , delegation is not feasible when
monitoring is precluded. We will show that there is a nonempty subset ∆F of Fc such that dele-
gation becomes feasible when monitoring can be used strategically by the principal. Delegation
with monitoring is a Pareto improvement over pure delegation for parameters belong to ∆F .
Proposition 9 When (γ, ξ) ∈ Fc , delegation is infeasible without monitoring. When monitoring is
possible, delegation becomes feasible iff (γ, ξ, g) are such that:
∆F = {(γ, ξ, g)|β > 0, α(γ, ξ)+ λ > 1, g < g¯}
where
g¯ = gˆ − 1
a
√
β(1− γ)λ2(1− λ−α(γ, ξ)(1− γ)(1− ξ))
∆F is nonempty iff (γ, ξ) are such that the following hold
α(γ, ξ)+ λ > 1, β > 0
(1− γ)(α(γ, ξ)− β+ βξ)2 > β(1− λ−α(γ, ξ)(1− γ)(1− ξ))
Proof Relegated to the appendix. 
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For parameters (γ, ξ) ∈ F , delegation is feasible when monitoring is precluded. The possibility
of monitoring will not reduce the magnitude of the set F , since the principal can always choose
zero monitoring when monitoring reduces her payoff. Monitoring weakly improves the principal’s
payoff, but decreases the agent’s payoff in comparison to pure delegation. In choosing between
pure delegation and delegation with monitoring, the principal is subjected to the individual ratio-
nality constraint of the agent that the agent is no worse off than his status under centralisation so
that he will not ignore delegation. We will show that monitoring improves the principal’s payoff
for parameters values in a subset FM . The overall social welfare effect is not clear since the agent’s
payoff decreases.
Proposition 10 When (γ, ξ) ∈ F , monitoring improves the principal’s payoff for the parameters
belonging to set FM , with
FM = {(γ, ξ, g)|β > 0, α(γ, ξ)+ λ > 1, g < gˆ}
Proof The proof is again relegated to the appendix. 
Proposition (9) and (10) tell us that delegation takes place more often when monitoring is not
precluded. We also know the optimal choice of the principal in her delegation decision at stage
t = 1 when monitoring is indeed possible:
Corollary 1 When monitoring is possible, the optimal authority regime is
1) Delegation with monitoring if (γ, ξ, g) ∈ FM ∪∆F ;
2) Delegation without monitoring if (γ, ξ, g) ∈ F/FM .
3) Centralisation if (γ, ξ, g) ∈ Fc/∆F .
We close this section with a numerical example.
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Figure 2: Optimal Authority Regime for (λ,a, g) = (0.95,0.2,0.1)
Example 1 Suppose (λ,a, g) = (0.95,0.2,0.1).
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1. (γ, ξ) = (0.3,0.66) is an element from set Fc . Without monitoring, delegation is infeasible.
When the principal can monitor, a positive level of monitor m = 0.164 improves the prin-
cipal’s payoff by ∆MP = 0.017 and increases the agent’s payoff by ∆MA = 0.054. Delegation
with monitoring is a Pareto improvement over centralisation and pure delegation. The entire
feasible set of delegation for (λ,a, g) = (0.95,0.2,0.1) is indicated as ∆F in Figure (2).
2. (γ, ξ) = (0.6,0.7) is an element from set F (FD + FM in Figure (2)). In comparison to pure
delegation, delegation with monitoring improves the principal’s payoff by 0.033 and decreases
the agent’s payoff by 0.187. The total social welfare decreases. The set that the principal’s
payoff is higher under delegation with monitoring is denoted by FM in Figure (2).
5. conclusions
We developed a theory of authority, based on the common conception in sociology and business
adminstration. We distinguish formal authority and real authority to answer the important ques-
tions such as how human assets are transacted and the resulting inefficiencies. It is true that the
inalienable property discriminates human assets from physical assets, but the formal (nominal)
right of employing human assets is still contractible within some limits and separation of formal
authority and real authority prevails in economic relations. The critical problem with human as-
sets is that formal authority is difficult to verify and enforce. An employer of human assets has
to provide sufficient incentives to induce desirable actions when the contract of formal authority
is incomplete or legal enforcement is hardly possible.
Delegation is an important instrument to invite incentives as it allows for free manipulation
of human assets by the body of these human assets. Balancing a tradeoff between inducing
incentives and losing control, the principal decides how to allocate formal authority by choosing
centralisation or delegation. As we put emphasis on value of real authority over human assets,
the nature of production process, which is a joint result of human assets and physical assets,
is the key determinant of allocation of authority. Delegation is more likely when tasks are not
too simple and assets are not too specific. We also analyzed the role monitoring plays in the
decision of delegation. Monitoring expands the principal’s action space and serves as an additional
instrument to fine tune the tradeoff between incentive and control. Value of monitoring depends
on structure of the game.
Our model is general and simple enough to incorporate repeated interactions, information
asymmetry, multiple tasks and multiple agents etc. One additional advantage of the theory is that
the production process is basically measurable, at least from the point of view of the involved
players. As a result, it is possible to make reasonable specifications and put them to empirical
test.
Despite a wide range of applications, our theory should be regarded as a start point to address
the issue of transaction of human assets. Many important questions are left unanswered. One
fundamental issue is why the principal accepts formal authority over an agent’s human assets
at the first place when she knows that it would be better for her to delegate formal authority
back to the agent. Put in other words, in our model, it is assumed that the capitalist employs
the worker, but it may be Pareto improvement if the worker purchases (possibly with credit) the
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physical assets and employs the capitalist. This is closely related to the theory of firm and deserves
careful investigation.
In our model, the ex ante inefficiency of the contract comes from an exogenous sharing rule
and this inefficiency can be mitigated by delegation but in general can not be eliminated ex post
as we rule out renegotiation and monetary transfer by assumptions. It would be possible to
improve efficiency by relaxing some of these assumptions and introducing more actions to the
players. For instance, the principal may design the acceptance area to make the agent’s actions
more enforceable. This is of particular interests when the principal faces multiple tasks. Another
possibility is to allow the principal to design payment scheme. We expect that payment scheme is a
substitute to delegation but if an efficient payment scheme is not available, allocation of authority
still plays a role. Interaction between task design or payment design and decision of delegation
requires more structure of the players’ preferences.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 9 Suppose β > 0 and (1− γ)− α(γ, ξ)(1− γ)(1− ξ) > 0 ((γ, ξ) ∈ Fc).
Recall that VMP = VCP +∆1(m¯M), and ∆1(m¯M) is the maximizer of ∆1(m) with:
∆1(m) = K1m2 +K2m+K3
where
K1 = −λa(1− γ)β, K2 = −(g − gˆ)
K3 = −λa ((1− γ)−α(γ, ξ)(1− γ)(1− ξ))
By assumption, K1 < 0 and K3 < 0. The principal will only delegate authority if ∆1(m¯M) > 0. For
the existence of such m¯M , the necessary and sufficient conditions are
K2 > 0, K22 − 4K1K3 > 0
K2 > 0 is satisfied iff g < gˆ and K22 −4K1K3 > 0 is satisfied iff g < g¯. Since g¯ is smaller than gˆ, g¯
gives the upper bound of g that guarantees the existence of a positive monitoring level that leads
to a positive value of ∆1(m).
Suppose g < g¯, denote the roots of ∆1(m) = 0 asm1 andm2, withm1 <m2. Ifm1 < ξ, then
we are assured of the existence of a positive monitoring level that leads to an improvement of the
principal’s payoff (∆1(m¯M) > 0).
m1 =
−K2 +
√
K22 − 4K2K3
2K1
< ξa g > −1
a
γξ(1− λ)(2− γ)
which always holds since g > 0.
However, in choosing the optimal monitoring level, the principal is subjected to the individual
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rationality (IR) constraint of the agent:
VMA ≥ VCA a α(γ, ξ)− βm¯M ≥ 1− λ
This constraint gives us the maximum monitoring the agent can bear when he accepts delegation,
mmax = α(γ,ξ)−1+λβ . As long as thismmax ≥m1 > 0, there always exists a positive monitoring level
that improves the principal’s payoff without violating the agent’s IR condition. g < g¯ guarantees
that m1 > 0. A necessary condition for mmax ≥m1 is α(γ, ξ)+ λ > 1. Supposing this condition
holds, we have:
mmax ≥m1 a g ≥ − γ
2(1− λ)λ
α(γ, ξ)+ λ− 1
which is always satisfied. Therefore, the condition needed to satisfy the agent’s IR is given by
α(γ, ξ)+ λ > 1.
We have completed our proof that ∆F is indeed the set of parameters that the principal will
delegate when monitoring is possible but not when monitoring is precluded. To ensure that ∆F
is nonempty, we need g¯ > 0, which immediately gives us the last part of the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 10 We want to show that for (γ, ξ) ∈ FM ⊂ F , VMP > VDP , subject to the
agent’s IR constraint that VMA ≥ VCA .
Recall that VMP = VDP +∆2(m¯M) with m¯M the maximizer of ∆2(m).
∆2(m) = −λa(1− γ)βm
2 − (g − gˆ)m
Obviously one root of ∆2(m) = 0 is 0. A necessary and sufficient condition that a positive moni-
toring level exists such that ∆2(m) > 0 is that
d
dm
(∆2(m))|m=0 = g − gˆ > 0 a g < gˆ
Again due to the individual rationality constraint of the agent, the maximum monitoring level the
agent can accept under delegation is given by mmax. As long as mmax > 0, there always exists a
positive monitoring level that the agent’s IR condition is satisfied. This requires α(γ, ξ)+ λ > 1.
This completes our proof that for (γ, ξ, g) ∈ FM , monitoring improves the principal’s payoff. 
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